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Abstract
We present a model of labor markets that accounts for the social network through which
agents hear about jobs. We show that both wages and employment are positively associated
(a strong form of correlation) across time and agents. We also analyze the decisions of agents
regarding staying in the labor market or dropping out. If there are costs to staying in the labor
market, then networks of agents that start with a worse wage status will have higher drop-out
rates and there will be a persistent dierences in wages between groups according to the starting
states of their networks.
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This paper was formerly part of Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004). That paper was split into two parts, with
the part under the former title looking at a special case of the networks outlined here and focusing on employment
dynamics, and this part looking at a more general set of networks and exploring both wage and employment dynamics.
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1 Introduction
One of the most extensively studied issues in labor economics is the persistent inequality in wages
between whites and blacks.
1
Even if one believes any inequality in wages between social groups to
be entirely explainable by dierences in factors such as education, skills, and drop-out rates; one is
still left to explain why those should dier.
2
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of how social networks operate in the trans-
mission of job information, and to show that such a model can account for the observed patterns
of wages and employment as well as dierences in drop-out patterns and their roles in sustaining
inequality. An analysis of social networks provides a basis for observing both higher drop-out rates
in one race versus another and sustained inequality in wages and employment rates even among
those remaining in the labor force.
3
Our model builds upon a well-established stylized fact: a signicant fraction of all jobs are
found through contacts. While estimates of the percentage of jobs found through social contacts
vary across location and profession, they consistently range between 25 and 80% of jobs in a given
profession.
4
We model the transmission of job information among individuals by a function that
keeps track of who rst heard about a job and who (if anyone) eventually ended up getting an
oer for that job. The key condition that we impose on this function is that the expected number
of oers that a given agent ends up with is nondecreasing in the wage status of other agents.
Allowing agents also to randomly lose jobs, wages can be shown to follow a Markov process, with
state transitions depending on the information transmission network. We prove that the resulting
stationary distribution is strongly associated; that is, the wages of any path-connected agents are
positively correlated under the steady-state distribution. The proof is not as easy as one might
expect, as there is a countervailing eect that path-connected agents are sometimes in competition
for information about certain jobs. This entails some within period negative correlation among
the status of certain agents. So we have to prove that the long run benets of improved status
of friends-of-friends outweighs the short run competition that they might represent. Next, to
establish persistent inequality between wages of dierent types of agents, we analyze drop-out
decisions where agents decide whether to enter the labor market or to drop out. We model the
drop-out decision as a simultaneous-move game, where agents compare the discounted expected
ow of future wages stemming from entering the labor force with the corresponding discounted
costs (such as education costs, opportunity costs, skills maintenance, etc.). Because individual
wages are positively associated across agents, entry decisions in this entry/drop-out game turn
1
For instance, see Smith and Welch (1989), Card and Krueger (1992), Chandra (2000), Heckman, Lyons, and
Todd (2000). See Farley (1990) for data on other racial- ethnic groups in the U.S.
2
The extent to which inequality is explainable by such factors is still a point of some debate. See for instance,
Darity and Mason (1998) and Heckman (1998).
3
A social network model of inequality complementary to other theories. For discussion of some other theories and
the relation of social networks approach, see Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004).
4
See Ioannides and Loury (2004) for an excellent and extensive survey on the role of social networks in labor
markets.
1
out to be strategic complements. Applying the theory of supermodular games, we deduce that
two dierent social groups with identical job information networks but diering in their starting
wage and employment prole will have dierent drop-outs rates that can be strictly ranked. These
dierences in drop-out patterns in turn breed persistent dierences in wages between the two groups.
This theory thus highlights the role of collective employment history in persistent wage inequality
across social groups.
5
This paper has a companion paper: Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004), which examines a
specic case of the model considered here. The main contributions here are twofold. First, we
consider a much more general model both in the passing of job information and in the structure of
wages and their relation to job oers. Most applications would t into the broader class examined
here rather than the specic case examined in the companion paper. Second, we study wage
dynamics rather than just employment dynamics, which is important as much of the empirical
evidence for inequality relates to wage dierences between races.
We note that the techniques and results that we have developed here also have applications
beyond labor markets. In particular, the association and correlation patterns that we nd based on
the underlying p's generalize to very dierent interpretations of the p's   such as the chance that
some agent inuences the behavior of another agent (such as inducing them to take up smoking,
join a club, engage in crime, etc.). Thus, it can be that the results and tools developed here will be
of use in modeling a wide variety of social interactions where networked relations are important.
2 A Model of Networks in Labor Markets
We begin with a formal description of our model.
2.1 Wage and Employment Status
The random variable W
it
keeps track of the wage of agent i at time t. W
it
takes on values in IR
+
;
the unemployment wage is 0. The vector w
t
= (w
1t
; : : : ; w
nt
) is a realization of wage levels at t.
6
We represent random variables by capitol letters and realizations by small letters. The sequence
of random variables fW
0
;W
1
;W
2
; : : :g comprises the stochastic process of wage status.
The random variable S
it
is the employment status of agent i at time t. Employment status is
derived from wage status. We set s
it
= 1 when i is employed, and s
it
= 0 otherwise. So, the vector
s
t
2 f0; 1g
n
is a realization of the employment status at t.
5
This complements a large body of theoretical work built on models of discrimination (e.g., Becker 1957, Arrow
1972), imperfect capital markets (Loury 1981), and local public goods (Benabou 1993, 1996 and Durlauf 1996), among
others. See Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) for additional discussion.
6
While we use the term wages, this random variable might be thought of as representing the expected discounted
value of wages in a position. This distinction can be important in situations where some jobs have lower starting
salaries but higher overall discounted sum of future wages.
2
2.2 Labor Market Turnover
Labor market turnover proceeds repeatedly through two phases.
 In one phase, agents hear about new jobs. If an agent directly hears about a job vacancy, then
she either keeps that information or passes the job on to one of her contacts in the network.
 In the other phase, each currently employed agent i is red with probability b
i
2 (0; 1), termed
the breakup rate.
These phases occur repeatedly over time. The way we index periods is thus un-important. It
is convenient to consider the hiring phase rst and then the breakup phase.
2.3 Specics of Information Transmission
The job transmission and oer generation is described by a function p
ij
: IR
n
+
! [0; 1]. Here
p
ij
(W
t 1
) is the probability that i originally hears about a job and then it is eventually j that ends
up with an oer for that job.
The function p
ij
is a reduced form that can accommodate a variety of situations, including
selective passing of information, passing multiple times and/or to multiple agents, and competition
among agents for the same job. All that is important for our analysis is to keep track of who rst
heard about a job and who (if anyone) eventually ended up getting an oer for the job.
Let p
i
(w) =
P
j
p
ji
(w). This is the expected number of oers that i will get when the wage
state in the last period is w. We take the realizations under p
ji
(w) and p
ki
(w) independent.
7
Let p denote the vector of functions across i and j. Let w denote the maximum value in the
range of wages. The functions p
ij
are assumed to satisfy the following conditions on their support:
(1) p
ji
(w) is nondecreasing in w
 i
and nonincreasing in w
i
for every ji,
(2) p
ji
(w) > 0 implies p
ji
(w
 i
; w
0
i
) > 0 when w
i
 w
0
i
< w
i
for each ji; and p
i
(w) > 0 for any w
and i such that w
i
< w
i
(3) if p
i
(w) > p
i
(w
 j
;
e
w
j
) for j 6= i and
e
w
j
, then p
i
is increasing in w
j
whenever w
i
< w
i
.
(1) encompasses the idea that other agents are (weakly) more likely to directly or indirectly pass
information on that will reach i if they are more satised with their own position, and also that
they might have better access to such information as their situation improves. It also encompasses
the idea that other agents are (weakly) less likely to compete with i for an oer if they are more
satised with their own position. The second requirement is similar but keeps track of i's wage.
7
Note that this is very dierent from the realizations under p
ij
and p
ik
, which will generally be negatively cor-
related. So we are just assuming that j and k do not coordinate on whether they pass i a job. If indirect passing
is present, then this embodies an assumption that the correlation in indirect passing is negligible. This is only a
simplifying assumption, as when periods become small the probability of more than one job being in the system at
a time becomes negligible.
3
Note that this allows for i to be more likely to directly hear about a job as i's situation worsens
(allowing for a greater search intensity).
(2) requires that if an agent is not at their highest wage level, then there is some probability
that they will obtain an oer both directly and from other agents who pass them information. This
is important in making sure that i does not have incentives to turn down a job in order to inuence
the probability of getting multiple oers in some future period.
(3) is a simplifying assumption. This guarantees that if i's probability of hearing about a job is
sometimes sensitive to j's status, then it is sensitive to j's status whenever i is not at the highest
wage level. This simply allows us to make statements about strictly positive correlations that do
not need to be conditioned on particular circumstances.
Let us briey describe a couple of examples that t into our model.
First, consider a network of connections among agents described by a weighted and directed
graph g, an n  n matrix with g
ij
2 IR
+
. Jobs are all identical (e.g., unskilled labor) and wages
depend only on whether a worker is employed or not. At the beginning of each period, agent i
hears of some available job with probability a
i
2 (0; 1). When i hears of a job and is unemployed,
then i takes the job. If i is employed, then he randomly picks an unemployed acquaintance with
weights proportional to g
ij
and passes the information along. If all direct contacts are employed,
then the information is lost. The special case where the a
i
's are the same across i and where g
ij
takes on values either 0 and 1 and g
ij
= g
ji
is analyzed in Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004). We
can also allow agents to relay information in the case that all of their acquaintances are employed.
Next, let jobs be heterogeneous and wages take on dierent values. Let w
i
be the highest wage
attainable by agent i. At the beginning of each period, agent i hears about a job opening oering
a wage w
i
with probability a
w
i
i
2 (0; 1). If i directly hears about a new job that pays a higher wage
than i's current job position, then agent i keeps that information.
8
If the new job does not oer
any improvement, then agent i randomly passes the information on to one of his direct contacts
with a current wage lower than that of the new job, with weights related to link intensities.
2.4 The Determination of Oers, Wages, and Employment
Determination of Oers
Let O
it
be the random variable denoting the number of new opportunities that i has in hand
at the end of the hiring process in period t. Given W
t 1
= w, the distribution of O
t
is governed by
the realizations of the p
ij
(w)'s.
Determination of Employment
The employment status evolves as follows. If agent i was employed at the end of time t   1
and/or receives oers in period t, then the agent is employed (S
it
= 1) with probability (1   b
i
)
and is unemployed (S
it
= 0) with probability b
i
. If agent i was unemployed at the end of time t  1
and receives no new oers, the agent stays unemployed (S
it
= 0).
8
A given agent may end up with oers for several jobs, as we discuss next. So holding on to information does not
necessarily imply that an agent takes that job.
4
Determination of Wages
The evolution of wages is as follows. The function w
i
: IR
+
 f0; 1; 2; : : :g ! IR
+
describes the
wage that i obtains as a function of i's previous wage and the number of new job opportunities that
i ends up with at the end of the hiring phase. It is increasing in past wages, with w
i
(W
i;t 1
; O
it
) 
W
i;t 1
.
9
We also assume that w
i
(W
i;t 1
; O
it
) is nondecreasing in the number of new oers received,
O
it
, and that w
i
(0; 1) > 0 so that a new job brings a positive wage. The wage might be increasing
in the number of oers an agent has because competition between employers bids the wage up (e.g.,
see Arrow and Borzekowski (2001)), or simply due to a better match.
We assume that w
i
takes on a nite set of values that fall in simple steps so that if w
0
> w are
adjacent in the range of w
i
, then w
0
i
= w
i
(w; 1). Wages are thus delineated so that an agent may
reach the next higher wage level with one oer. We assume that the highest wage an agent may
obtain is above 0, that is w
i
> 0, and that w
i
(w
0
; o)  w
i
(w; o + 1) for any o and w
0
and w such
that w
0
i
> w
i
. Having a higher wage is thus at least as good as having one additional oer starting
from a lower wage (at least in expectations).
The wage of agent i then evolves as W
it
= w
i
(W
i;t 1
; O
it
)S
it
, where S
it
keeps track of i's
employment status after the breakup phase.
Networks
We say that i is connected with j if p
i
(w) 6= p
i
(w
 j
;
e
w
j
) for some w and
e
w
j
.
The term \connected" does not necessarily mean that i and j pass information to each other;
it is just that their statuses directly or indirectly aect each other's probability of hearing about a
job.
10
Let
N
i
(p) = fj j i is connected with jg
We assume that connections are at least minimally reciprocal, so that i 2 N
j
(p) if and only if
j 2 N
i
(p). In the absence of such an assumption, all of the nonnegative correlation results that we
establish still hold; however, for strictly positive correlations to ensue, it must be that information
can have implications that travel suÆciently through the network to have one agent's status aect
another.
By keeping track of further levels of \connection" (i is connected to j is connected to k...), we
partition the set of agents so that all the agents in any element of the partition are path connected
to each other. We denote this partition by (p).
We assume that any element of the partition,  2 (p), contains at least two agents, as
completely isolated agents have dynamics of wages and employment that are trivial.
An Economy
Given a specication of N , p
i
's, and b
i
's, and an initial distribution over states 
0
, the stochastic
process of employment fS
1
; S
2
; : : :g and wages fW
1
;W
2
; : : :g is completely specied. We refer to
the specication of (N; p; b) satisfying the properties that we have outlined as an economy.
9
Below, we discuss a direct extension of the model to include multiple job types, so that wages depend on the
number of oers for dierent job types.
10
Note that it is also possible that p
ij
> 0, but i and j not be \connected" in cases where p
i
does not depend on
w
j
.
5
3 The Dynamics and Patterns of Wage and Employment
It is easy to show that improving the state of an agent's neighbors' wages and/or employment will
improve the agent's future wages in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance; and similarly, if
we add new neighbors to an agents' neighborhood. Deriving correlation patterns among agents'
wages is more diÆcult, and what we turn to now.
3.1 Wage Patterns and Dynamics
Suppose that agents are more likely to pass job information to direct connections with lower wages
than to those with higher wages. Take an agent who has a low wage, but whose wage is still higher
than some other agents who compete with her for information about a job. Then, this agents' next
period expected wage may be lower than what she would expect by quitting her job. Indeed, if she
were to quit her job, more of her connections may pass information to her, yielding to a positive
probability of getting several oers at once. This case is not precluded under the assumptions on
p. It is due to the fact that the model does not fully separate the arrival of oers over time. This
diÆculty is overcome when we look at ne enough subdivisions of a period. Then, the probability
of obtaining more than one oer becomes negligible compared to the probability of just one oer.
T -period Subvidisions
Starting from an economy (N; p; b), the T -period subdivision, denoted (N; p
T
; b
T
), is such that
b
T
i
=
b
i
T
and p
T
ij
=
p
ij
T
for each i and j.
Association
While rst order stochastic dominance is well suited for capturing distributions over a single
agent's status, we need a richer tool for discussing interrelationships between a number of agents at
once. There is a generalization of rst order stochastic dominance to random vectors, association,
introduced into the statistics literature by Esary, Proschan, and Walkup (1967).
A probability measure  describing a random vector (e.g., W dened on IR
n
) is associated if
Cov

(f; g)  0
for all pairs of non-decreasing functions f : IR
n
! IR and g : IR
n
! IR, where Cov(f; g) is the
covariance E

[f(W )g(W )] E

[f(W )]E

[g(W )].
Association tells us good news in the sense of higher values of W
i
; i 2 fi
1
; : : : ; i
`
g about any
subset of agents (here, fi
1
; : : : ; i
`
g) is good (not bad) news for any other set of agents.
We say that W
1
; : : : ;W
n
are associated if these are random variables described by an associated
measure . Independent random variables are associated. Also, if W is a random vector described
by , then association of  implies that W
i
and W
j
are non-negatively correlated for any i and j.
Strong Association
We also dene a strong version of association, useful to establish strictly positive relationships.
6
A probability measure  describing a random vector on IR
n
is strongly associated relative to
the partition  if it is associated, and for any  2  and nondecreasing functions f and g
Cov

(f; g) > 0
whenever there exist i and j such that f is increasing in w
i
for all w
 i
, g is increasing in w
j
for all
w
 j
, and i and j are path connected under .
Strong association captures the idea that better information about any of the dimensions in 
leads to strictly higher expectations regarding every other dimension in . One implication of this
is that W
i
and W
j
are positively correlated for any i and j in .
Theorem 1 Consider an economy (N; p; b). For all T , let 
T
be the (unique) steady state distri-
bution of (N; p
T
; b
T
).
 The limit, , of the steady state distributions 
T
is strongly associated relative to (p). Thus,
the wages of any path connected agents are positively correlated under  and 
T
for large
enough T .
 Starting from the steady state distribution, there is a strictly positive correlation between the
wage statuses of any path connected agents and at any times. That is, for any times t and t
0
and large enough T ,
Cov
T

W
it
W
jt
0

> 0;
where i and j are path connected and Cov
T
is the covariance associated with the T -period
subdivision starting at time 0 under the steady state distribution 
T
.
The theorem states that any path connected agents have positively correlated wage levels in
steady state and across time, and in fact exhibit strong association. The limit of the steady state
distributions as T becomes large is a very natural thing to consider, as it is a Poisson birth/death
process which would naturally describe the job search. The reason we work with a discrete time
approximation is purely for tractability in separating out the hiring and break-up phases.
The proof of Theorem 1 is long and appears in the appendix. The proof can be broken down
into several steps. The rst step shows that for large enough T the steady state distribution is
approximately the same as one for a process where the realizations of p
ij
(w) across dierent j's
is independent. The idea is that for large enough T , the probability that just one job is heard
about overwhelms the probability that more than one job is heard about. This is also true under
independence. The proof then uses a characterization of steady state distributions of Markov
processes by Freidlin and Wentzel (1984) (as adapted to nite processes by Young (1993)). We use
the characterization to verify that one can simply keep track of the probabilities of just a single job
event to get the approximate steady state distribution for large enough T . Next, note that under
independence of job hearing, there are no short-run negative conditional correlations. So we can
establish that the conclusions of the theorem are true under the independent process. Finally, we
come back to show that the same still holds under the true (dependent) process, for large enough
T .
7
3.2 Employment Patterns and Dynamics
One might conjecture (as we initially did) that it would be a simple corollary to Theorem 1 for
employment to exhibit the same positive correlation structure as wages. While the strong associa-
tion of wages ensures that employment is weakly associated across agents, it is still possible for two
agents to have positively correlated wages and yet have their employment status be independent.
This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 1 Positive Correlation of Wages but Independence of Employment.
Let agent i's wages take on three values f0; 1; 2g and agent j's wages take on two values f0; 1g.
Let i and j be path connected (but say not connected).
11
Consider a limiting steady state distri-
bution which has the following marginal distribution on W
i
and W
j
:
w
j
= 0 w
j
= 1
w
i
= 2
1
12
1
4
w
i
= 1
1
4
1
12
w
i
= 0
1
6
1
6
Under this distribution, W
i
and W
j
are positively correlated. Yet, S
i
and S
j
are independent:
s
j
= 0 s
j
= 1
s
i
= 1
1
3
1
3
s
i
= 0
1
6
1
6
This points out that much richer information can be obtained by tracking wages as opposed to
employment, which is simply 0-1. For instance, if agents have reasonably high employment rates,
then network eects will mainly be observed through their wage dynamics and correlations, as the
quality of their jobs may vary dramatically even though their employment status may not.
This type of distribution cannot arise if p is a function of S rather than of W . With that added
condition we can establish variations of Theorem 1 for employment by similar methods.
12
4 Dropping Out and Long-Run Inequality
Consider the following game endogenizing the network structure. Let d
i
2 f0; 1g denote i's decision
of whether to stay in the labor market. Each agent discounts future wages at a rate 0 < Æ
i
< 1 and
pays an expected discounted cost c
i
 0 to stay in. Agents dropping out get a payo of zero.
11
That is, i and j wage statuses do not inuence each other, but i and j are connected through a chain of agents
whose wages statuses do inuence each other.
12
Having xed an initial state W
0
, an economy induces a Markov chain on the state W
t
. Note that this does not
correspond to a Markov chain on the state S
t
, as the probability of transitions from S
t
to S
t+1
can still depend on
W
t
(rather than just S
t
) and hence on t for a given starting distribution. Nevertheless, as the wage states do form a
Markov chain, there is a steady state distribution induced on the wage state W . As S is a coarsening of W , there is
a corresponding steady state distribution on S.
8
An augmented economy is (N; p; b; c; Æ), where c and Æ are vectors of costs and discount rates.
When an agent i exits the labor force, we reset the p's so that p
ij
(w) = p
ji
(w) = 0 for all j and
w, but do not alter the other p
kj
's. The agent who drops out has his or her wage set to zero.
13
Therefore, when an agent drops out, it is as if the agent disappeared from the economy.
Fix an augmented economy (N; p; b; c; Æ) and a starting state W
0
= w. A vector of decisions d
is an equilibrium if for each i 2 f1; : : : ; ng, d
i
= 1 implies
E
"
X
t
Æ
t
i
W
it
jW
0
= w; d
 i
#
 c
i
;
and d
i
= 0 implies the reverse inequality.
The \drop-out" game is supermodular (see Topkis (1979)) which leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider any augmented economy (N; p; b; c; Æ) and state W
0
= w. There exists T
0
such
that for any T -period subdivision of the economy (T  T
0
), there is a unique equilibrium d

(w) such
that d

(w)  d for any other equilibrium d.
We refer to the equilibrium d

(w) in Lemma 1 as the maximal equilibrium.
Theorem 2 Consider any augmented economy (N; p; b; c; Æ). Consider two starting wages states,
w
0
 w with w 6= w
0
. There exists T
0
such that the set of drop-outs under the maximal equilibrium
following w
0
is a subset of that under w for any T -period subdivision (T  T
0
); for some specica-
tions of the costs and discount rates the inclusion is strict. Moreover, if d

(w)
i
= d

(w
0
)
i
= 1, then
the distributions of i's wages and employment W
it
and S
it
for any t under the maximal equilibrium
following w
0
rst order stochastic dominate those under the maximal equilibrium following w, with
strict dominance for large enough t if d

(w)
j
6= d

(w
0
)
j
for any j who is path connected to i. In
fact, for any increasing f : IR
n
+
! IR and any t
E
T

f(W
t
)


W
0
= w
0
; d

(w
0
)

 E
T
[f(W
t
) jW
0
= w; d

(w) ] ;
with strict inequality for some specications of c and Æ.
Theorem 2 shows how persistent inequality can arise between two otherwise similar groups with
dierent initial employment conditions.
4.1 Multiple Job Types
The model we have presented does not dierentiate between dierent types of jobs: wages depend
only on current wage levels and the number of received oers. In some situations, a worker might
be qualied for dierent types of jobs and might even have dierent networks for dierent types
of jobs. The model is easily extended to accommodate such situations by simply keeping track
13
This choice is not innocuous, as we must make some choice as to how to reset the function p
kj
when i drops out,
as this is a function of w
i
. How we set this has implications for agent j if agent j remains in the economy.
9
of oers for dierent types of jobs via dierent p's. Wages are then a function of the best oer
received in a given period. The monotonicity conditions readily extend as do all of our results.
As an illustration, consider a world with two types of jobs  low-skilled and high-skilled, where
high-skilled jobs pay a higher wage rate than low-skilled jobs. If an agent is unemployed and
receives oers only for low-skilled jobs, then he or she will take a low skilled job. If an agent hears
about a high-skilled job, then he or she will take a high-skilled job. If an agent is unemployed,
then he or she will only pass on information about low-skilled jobs if he or she also happens to
get information about a high-skilled job. If an agent is already employed, then the probability of
passing on information about both low-skilled and/or a high-skilled job is higher. The monotonicity
conditions still naturally hold.
14
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Appendix
The following denitions and lemmas are useful in the proof of Theorem 1.
 and  are two probability measures on a state space that is a subset of IR
n
.  dominates  if
E

[f ]  E

[f ]
for every non-decreasing function f : IR
n
! IR.
15
The domination is strict if strict inequality holds
for some non-decreasing f . When n = 1, domination reduces to rst order stochastic dominance.
Lemma 2 Consider two measures  and  on IR
n
which have supports that are a subset of a nite
set W  IR
n
.  dominates  if and only if there exists a Markov transition function  :W ! P(W )
(where P(W ) is the set of probability measures on W ) such that
(w
0
) =
X
w

ww
0
(w);
where  is a dilation (that is 
ww
0
> 0 implies that w
0
 w). Strict domination holds if 
ww
0
> 0
for some w
0
6= w.
Thus,  derives from  by an \upwards" shift of mass under the partial order  over w 2W .
Proof of Lemma 2: This follows from Theorem 18.40 in Aliprantis and Border (2000).
The set of subsets of states such that if one state is in the event then all states with at least as
high wages (person by person) are also in is:
E = fE W j w 2 E;w
0
 w ) w
0
2 Eg:
Variations of the following useful lemma appear in the statistics literature (e.g., see Section 3.3
in Esary, Proschan and Walkup (1967)). We include a proof of this version for completeness.
15
We can take the probability measures to be Borel measures and E

[f ] simply represents the usual
R
IR
n
f(x)d(x).
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Lemma 3 Consider two measures  and  on W . Then,  (E)   (E) for every E 2 E, if and
only if  dominates . Strict domination holds if and only if the rst inequality is strict for at
least one E 2 E. The measure  is associated if and only if (EE
0
)  (E)(E
0
) for every E and
E
0
2 E. The association is strong (relative to ) if the inequality is strict whenever E and E
0
are
both sensitive to some  2 .
16
Proof of Lemma 3: First, suppose that for every E 2 E :
 (E)   (E) : (1)
Take any f non-decreasing. Enumerate r
1
; : : : ; r
K
the elements on its range, r
K
> r
k 1
: : : > r
1
. Let
E
K
= f
 1
(r
K
). f non-decreasing implies that E
K
2 E . Inductively, dene E
k
= E
k+1
[ f
 1
(r
k 1
).
Clearly, E
k
2 E . Note that
17
f(w) =
X
k
(r
k
  r
k 1
)I
E
k
(w):
Thus,
E

(f(W
t
)) =
X
k
(r
k
  r
k 1
)(E
k
) and E

(f(W
t
)) =
X
k
(r
k
  r
k 1
)(E
k
):
By (1), E

(f(W
t
))  E

(f(W
t
)) for every non-decreasing f . This implies dominance. If (E) >
(E) for some E, then E

(I
E
(W
t
)) > E

(I
E
(W
t
)), and strict dominance follows.
Next let us show the converse. Suppose that  dominates . For any E 2 E , let f(w) = I
E
(w).
This is a non-decreasing function. Thus, E

(I
E
(W
t
))  E

(I
E
(W
t
)), and so  (E)   (E).
To see that strict dominance implies that  (E) >  (E) for some E, note that under strict
dominance we have some f for which
E

(f(W
t
)) =
X
k
(r
k
  r
k 1
)(E
k
) > E

(f(W
t
)) =
X
k
(r
k
  r
k 1
)(E
k
):
Since (E
k
)  (E
k
) for each E
k
, this implies that we have strict inequality for some E
k
.
The proof for association (and strong association) is a straightforward extension of the above
proof that we leave to the reader (or see Esary, Proschan and Walkup (1967)).
Lemma 4 Let  be associated and have full (nite) support on values of W . If f is nondecreasing
and is increasing in W
i
for some i, and g is a nondecreasing function which is increasing in W
j
for some j, and Cov

(W
i
;W
j
) > 0, then Cov

(f; g) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4: We rst prove the following Claim.
Claim 1 Let  be associated and have nite support. If f is an increasing function of W
i
which
depends only on W
i
, and g is an increasing function of W
j
which depends only on W
j
, and
Cov

(W
i
;W
j
) > 0, then Cov

(f (W ) ; g (W )) > 0.
16
E is sensitive to  if its indicator function is. A nondecreasing function f : IR
n
! IR is sensitive to  2 
(relative to ) if there exist x and ex

such that f(x) 6= f(x
 
; ex

) and x and x
 
; ex

are in the support of .
17
I
E
is the indicator function of E.
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Proof of Claim 1: We write
Cov

(W
i
;W
j
) =
Z
+1
 1
Z
+1
 1
Cov


I
W
i
(s) ; I
W
j
(t)

dsdt;
18
where I
W
i
(s) = 1 if W
i
> s, and I
W
i
(s) = 0, otherwise. By assumption, Cov

(W
i
;W
j
) > 0.
Therefore, Cov


I
W
i
(s) ; I
W
j
(t)

> 0 for a set of s; t's. Also,
Cov

(f (W
i
) ; g (W
J
)) =
Z
+1
 1
Z
+1
 1
Cov

(I
f
(s) ; I
g
(t)) dsdt; (2)
where I
f
(s) = 1 if f (W
i
) > s, and I
f
(s) = 0, otherwise. For each s as described above, there
exists some s
0
such that I
W
i
(s) = 1 if and only if I
f
(f (s
0
)) = 1, and similarly for t, g, and t
0
.
Therefore, Cov

(I
f
(f (s
0
)) ; I
g
(g (t
0
))) > 0. Given the nite support of W , the sets of such s; t's
and corresponding s
0
; t
0
's are unions of closed intervals with nonempty interiors. By association
also we know that Cov

(I
f
(f (s)) ; I
g
(g (t)))  0 for any s; t. Since this expression is positive on a
set with positive measure, and everywhere nonnegative, it follows from (2) that Cov

(f; g) > 0.
Next consider f that is increasing inW
i
, but might also depend onW
 i
. Label the possible wage
levels of i by w
k
i
where w
1
i
= 0 and w
K
i
= w
i
. Let  = min
Kk>1;w
 i
f(w
k
i
; w
 i
)   f(w
k 1
i
; w
 i
).
By the increasing property of f it follows that  > 0. Dene f
0
(w
k
i
) = f(0; : : : ; 0) + k

2
. Let
f
00
(w) = f(w)   f
0
(w
i
). It is easily checked that f
00
is non-decreasing. Similarly dene g
0
and g
00
for g relative to W
j
. Then
Cov(f; g) = Cov(f
00
; g
00
) + Cov(f
00
; g
0
) + Cov(f
0
; g
00
) + Cov(f
0
; g
0
):
By association, each expression is nonnegative. By Claim 1 the last expression is positive.
Fix the economy (N; p; b). Let P
T
denote the matrix of transitions between dierent w's under
the T -period subdivision. So P
T
ww
0
is the probability that W
t
= w
0
conditional on W
t 1
= w.
Let P
T
wE
=
P
w
0
2E
P
T
ww
0
.
Lemma 5 Consider an economy (N; p; b). Consider w
0
2 W and w 2 W such that w
0
 w, and
any t  1. Then there exists T
0
such that for all T  T
0
and E 2 E
P
T
w
0
E
 P
T
wE
:
Moreover, if w
0
6= w, then the inequality is strict for at least one E.
Proof of Lemma 5: Let us say that two states w
0
and w are adjacent if there exists ` such that
w
0
 `
= w
 `
and w
0
`
> w
`
take on adjacent values in the range of `'s wage function.
We show that
P
T
w
0
E
 P
T
wE
:
18
See, for instance, Corollary B in Section 3.1 of Szekli (1995). As  has nite support, these integrals trivially
exist.
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for large enough T and adjacent w and w
0
, as the statement then follows from a chain of comparisons
across such w
0
and w. Let ` be such that w
0
`
> w
`
. By denition of two adjacent wage vectors,
w
0
i
= w
i
, for all i 6= `. We write
P
T
wE
=
X
o
Prob
T
w
(W
t
2 EjO
t
= o)Prob
T
w
(O
t
= o);
where Prob
T
w
is the probability conditional on W
t 1
= w. Note that by property (1) of p, p
`j
(w
0
) 
p
`j
(w) for all j 6= `. Also since w
0
k
= w
k
for all k 6= ` property (1) also implies that p
ij
(w
0
)  p
ij
(w)
for all j 6= ` and for all i. These inequalities imply that Prob
T
w
0
(O
 `;t
) dominates Prob
T
w
(O
 `;t
). It
is only `, whose job prospects may have worsened.
Since w
0
`
> w
`
, given our assumption on wages (that w
i
(w
0
; o)  w
i
(w; o+1) for any o and w
0
and
w such that w
0
i
> w
i
), it is enough to show that for any a, Prob
T
w
0
(O
`;t
 a)  Prob
T
w
(O
`;t
 a+1).
This holds for large enough T , given the independence of dierent realizations of p
j`
and p
i`
for
i 6= j and property (2) of p, as then the probability of any given number of oers is of a higher
order than that of a greater number of oers (regardless of the starting state).
19
To see the strict domination, consider E = fwjw
`
 w
0
`
g. Since (for large enough T ) there is a
positive probability that ` hears 0 oers under w, the inequality is strict.
Given a measure  on W , let P
T
denote the measure induced by multiplying the (1n) vector
 by the (n  n) transition matrix P
T
. This is the distribution over states induced by a starting
distribution  multiplied by the transition probabilities P
T
.
Lemma 6 Consider an economy (N; p; b) and two measures  and  on W . There exists T
0
such
that for all T  T
0
, if  dominates , then P
T
dominates P
T
. Moreover, if  strictly dominates
, then P
T
strictly dominates P
T
.
Proof of Lemma 6:
[P
T
](E)  [P
T
](E) =
X
w
P
T
wE
(
w
  
w
) :
By Lemma 2 we rewrite this as
[P
T
](E)  [P
T
](E) =
X
w
X
w
0

w
0

w
0
w
P
T
wE
 
X
w

w
P
T
wE
:
As the second term depends only on w, we rewrite that sum on w
0
. Then, since  is a dilation (and

w
0
w
> 0 only if w  w
0
) we can sum over w  w
0
:
[P
T
](E)   [P
T
](E) =
X
w
0

w
0
0
@
X
ww
0

w
0
w
P
T
wE
  P
T
w
0
E
1
A
:
Lemma 5 implies that for large enough T , P
T
wE
 P
T
w
0
E
whenever w  w
0
. Thus since 
w
0
w
 0 and
P
ww
0

w
0
w
= 1; the result follows.
19
This holds provided w
0
`
< w
`
, but in the other case, the agent is already at the highest wage state and so the
claim is veried.
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Suppose that  strictly dominates . It follows from Lemma 2 that there exists some w 6= w
0
such that 
w
0
w
> 0. By Lemma 5, there exists some E 2 E such that P
T
wE
> P
T
w
0
E
. Then
[P
T
](E) > [P
T
](E) for such E, implying (by Lemma 3) that P
T
strictly dominates P
T
.
Proof of Theorem 1: Recall that P
T
denotes the matrix of transitions between dierent w's.
Since P
T
is an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain, it has a unique steady state distribution
that we denote by 
T
. The steady state distributions 
T
converge to a unique limit distribution
(see Young (1993)), which we denote 

.
Let P
T
be the transition matrix where the process is modied as follows. Starting in state w,
in the hiring phase each agent i hears about a new job (and at most one) with probability
p
i
(w)
T
and this is independent of what happens to other agents, while the breakup phase is as before with
independent probabilities
b
i
T
of losing jobs. Let 
T
be the associated (again unique) steady state
distribution, and 

= lim
T

T
(which is well-dened as shown in the proof of Claim 2 below).
The following claims establish the theorem.
Claim 2 

= 

.
Claim 3 

is strongly associated.
The following lemma is useful in the proof of Claim 2.
Let P be a transition matrix for an aperiodic irreducible Markov chain on a nite state space
Z.
For any z 2 Z, let a z-tree be a directed graph on the set of vertices Z, with a unique directed
path leading from each state z
0
6= z to z. Denote the set of all z-trees by T
z
. Let
p
z
=
X
2T
z


z
0
;z
00
2
P
z
0
z
00

: (3)
Lemma 7 Freidlin and Wentzel (1984):
20
If P is a transition matrix for an aperiodic, irreducible
Markov chain on a nite state space Z, then its unique steady state distribution  is described by
(z) =
p
z
P
z
0
2Z
p
z
0
;
where p
z
is as in (3) above.
Proof of Claim 2: Given w 2W , we consider a special subset of the set of T
w
, which we denote
T

w
. This is the set of w-trees such that if w
0
is directed to w
00
under the tree  , then w
0
and
w
00
are adjacent. As P
T
w
0
;w
00
goes to 0 at the rate 1=T when w
0
and w
00
are adjacent,
21
and other
transition probabilities go to 0 at a rate of at least 1=T
2
, it follows from Lemma 7 that 
T
(w) may
be approximated for large enough T by
P
2T

w
h

w
0
;w
00
2
P
T
w
0
w
00
i
P
bw
P
2T

bw


w
0
;w
00
2
P
T
w
0
w
00

:
20
See Chapter 6, Lemma 3.1; and also see Young (1993) for the adaptation to discrete processes.
21
Note that under property (3) of p, since w
0
and w
00
are adjacent, it must be that P
T
w
0
;w
00
6= 0.
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Moreover, note that for large T and adjacent w
0
and w
00
, P
T
w
0
w
00
is either
b
i
T
+o(1=T
2
) (when w
0
i
> w
00
i
)
or
p
i
(w
0
)
T
+o(1=T
2
) (when w
0
i
< w
00
i
), where o(1=T
2
) indicates a term that goes to zero at the rate of
1=T
2
. For adjacent w
0
and w
00
, let
e
P
T
w
0
w
00
=
b
i
T
when w
0
i
> w
00
i
, and
p
i
(w
0
)
T
when w
0
i
< w
00
i
.
22
It then
follows that


(w) = lim
T!1
P
2T

w
h

w
0
;w
00
2
e
P
T
w
0
w
00
i
P
bw
P
2T

bw
h

w
0
;w
00
2
e
P
T
w
0
w
00
i
: (4)
By a parallel argument, this is the same as 

(w).
Proof of Claim 3: Equation 4 and Claim 2 imply that


(w) = lim
T!1
P
2T

w
h

w
0
;w
00
2
e
P
T
w
0
w
00
i
P
bw
P
2T

bw
h

w
0
;w
00
2
e
P
T
w
0
w
00
i
:
Multiplying top and bottom of the fraction on the right hand side by T , we nd that


(w) =
P
2T

w
h

w
0
;w
00
2
b
P
w
0
w
00
i
P
bw
P
2T

bw
h

w
0
;w
00
2
b
P
w
0
w
00
i
; (5)
where
b
P
T
is set as follows. For adjacent w
0
and w
00
(letting i be the agent for whom w
0
i
6= w
00
i
)
b
P
T
w
0
w
00
= b
i
when w
0
i
> w
00
i
, and p
i
(w
0
) when w
0
i
< w
00
i
,
23
and
b
P
T
w
0
w
00
= 0 for non-adjacent w
0
and w
00
.
The proof of the claim is then established via the following steps.
Step 1: 

is associated.
Step 2: 

is strongly associated.
Proof of Step 1: We show that for any T and any associated , P
T
is associated. From this,
it follows that if we start from an associated 
0
at time 0 (say an independent distribution), then

0
(P
T
)
k
is associated for any k. Since 
T
= lim
k

0
(P
T
)
k
for any 
0
(as 
T
is the steady-state
distribution), and association is preserved under (weak) convergence,
24
this implies that 
T
is
associated for all T . Then again, since association is preserved under (weak) convergence, this
implies that lim
T

T
= 

is associated.
So, let us now show that for any T and any associated ,  = P
T
is associated. By Lemma 3,
we need to show that
(EE
0
)  (E)(E
0
)  0 (6)
for any E and E
0
in E . Write
(EE
0
)  (E)(E
0
) =
X
w
(w)

P
T
wEE
0
  P
T
wE
(E
0
)

:
Since W
t
is independent conditional on W
t 1
= w, it is associated.
25
Hence,
P
T
wEE
0
 P
T
wE
P
T
wE
0
:
22
We take T high enough such that all coeÆcients of the transition matrix
e
P are between 0 and 1.
23
If p
i
(w
0
) > 1 for some i and w
0
, we can divide top and bottom through by some xed constant to adjust, without
changing the steady state distribution.
24
See, for instance, P5 in Section 3.1 of Szekli (1995).
25
See, for instance, P2 in Section 3.1 of Szekli (1995).
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Substituting into the previous expression we nd that
(EE
0
)  (E)(E
0
) 
X
w
(w)P
T
wE

P
T
wE
0
  (E
0
)

: (7)
Under the properties of the p
ij
's, both P
T
wE
and

P
T
wE
0
  (E
0
)

are non-decreasing functions of
w. Thus, since  is associated, it follows from (7) that
(EE
0
)  (E)(E
0
) 
"
X
w
(w)P
T
wE
# "
X
w
(w)

P
T
wE
0
  (E
0
)

#
:
Then since
P
w
(w)

P
T
wE
0
  (E
0
)

= 0 (by the denition of ), the above inequality implies (6).
Proof of Step 2: We have already established association. Thus, we need to establish that for
any f and g that are increasing in some w
i
and w
j
respectively, where i and j are path connected,
Cov


(f; g) > 0:
By Lemma 4 it suÆces to verify that
Cov


(W
i
;W
j
) > 0
For any transition matrix P , let P
wij
=
P
w
0
P
ww
0
w
0
i
w
0
j
, and similarly P
wi
=
P
w
0
P
ww
0
w
0
i
. Thus
these are the expected values of the product W
i
W
j
and the wage W
i
conditional on starting at w
in the previous period, respectively.
Let
Cov
T
ij
=
X
w

T
(w)P
T
wij
 
X
w

T
(w)P
T
wi
X
w
0

T
(w
0
)P
T
w
0
j
:
It suÆces to show that for each i; j for all large enough T , we have Cov
T
ij
> 0.
The matrix P
T
has diagonal entries P
T
ww
which tend to 1 as T ! 1 while other entries tend
to 0. Thus, we use a closely associated matrix, which has the same steady state distribution, but
for which some other entries do not tend to 0.
Let
P
T
ww
0
=
(
TP
T
ww
0
if w 6= w
0
1 
P
w
00
6=w
TP
T
ww
00
if w
0
= w.
One can directly check that the unique steady state distribution of P
T
is the same as that of P
T
,
and thus also that
Cov
T
ij
=
X
w

T
(w)P
T
wij
 
X
w

T
(w)P
T
wi
X
w
0

T
(w
0
)P
T
w
0
j
:
Note also that transitions are still independent under P
T
. This implies that starting from any w,
the distribution P
T
w
is associated and so
P
T
wij
 P
T
wi
P
T
wj
:
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Therefore,
Cov
T
ij

X
w

T
(w)P
T
wi
P
T
wj
 
X
w

T
(w)P
T
wi
X
w
0

T
(w
0
)P
T
w
0
j
:
Note that P
T
wi
converges to
e
P
wi
, where
e
P
wi
is the rescaled version of
b
P (dened in the proof of
Claim 2),
e
P
ww
0
=
(
T
b
P
ww
0
if w 6= w
0
1 
P
w
00
6=w
T
b
P
ww
00
if w
0
= w.
It follows that
lim
T!1
Cov
T
ij

X
w


(w)
e
P
wi
e
P
wj
 
X
w


(w)
e
P
wi
X
w
0


(w
0
)
e
P
w
0
j
:
Thus, to complete the proof, it suÆces to show that
X
w


(w)
e
P
wi
e
P
wj
>
X
w


(w)
e
P
wi
X
w
0


(w
0
)
e
P
w
0
j
: (8)
Viewing
e
P
wi
as a function of w, this is equivalent to showing that Cov(
e
P
wi
;
e
P
wj
) > 0. From Step 1
we know that 

is associated. We also know that
e
P
wi
and
e
P
wj
are both non-decreasing functions
of w.
First let us consider the case where j 2 N
i
(p).
26
We know that
e
P
wi
is increasing in w
i
, and also,
given the assumptions on p, that
e
P
wi
is increasing ni w
j
for j 2 N
i
(p). Similarly,
e
P
wj
is increasing
in w
j
. (8) then follows from Lemma 4 (where we apply it to the case where W
i
=W
j
), as both
e
P
wi
and
e
P
wj
are increasing in w
j
.
Next, consider any k 2 N
j
(p). Repeating the argument above, since
e
P
wj
is increasing w
j
we
apply Lemma 4 again to nd that W
i
and W
k
are positively correlated. Repeating this argument
inductively leads to the conclusion that W
i
and W
k
are positively correlated for any i and k that
are path connected.
The rst part of Theorem 1 now follows from Claim 3 since 
T
! 

.We now show the second
part. We know from Claim 3 that 

is strongly associated. The result then follows by induction
using Lemma 6,
27
and then taking a large enough T so that 
T
is close enough to 

for the desired
strict inequalities to hold.
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider what happens when an agent i drops out. The resulting w
0
is
dominated by the w if that agent does not drop out. Furthermore, from Lemma 6 for large enough
T , the next period wage distribution over other agents when the agent drops out is dominated
by that when the agent stays in, if one were to assume that the agent were still able to pass
job information on. This domination then easily extends to the case where the agent does not
pass any job information on. Iteratively applying this, the future stream of wages of other agents
is dominated when the agent drops out relative to that where the agent stays in. This directly
26
If i is such that N
i
(p) = ;, then strong association is trivial. So we treat the case where at least two agents are
path connected.
27
While Lemma 6 does not state that the strict inequalities are preserved on given elements of the partition (p),
it is easy extension of the proof to see that this is true.
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implies that the drop-out game is supermodular. The lemma then follows from the theorem by
Topkis (1979).
Proof of Theorem 2: Let w  w
0
and d 2 f0; 1g
n
. We rst show that for large enough T
E
T

f(W
t
)


W
0
= w
0
; d

 E
T
[f(W
t
) jW
0
= w; d ] :
Lemma 5 implies that for a ne enough T -period subdivision and for every non-decreasing f ,
E
T

f(W
1
)


W
0
= w
0
; d

 E
T
[f(W
1
) jW
0
= w; d ] :
Lemma 6 and a simple induction argument then establish the inequality for all t  1. The inequality
is strict whenever f is increasing and w
0
> w.
Next, let d  d
0
. For a ne enough T -period subdivision and for every non-decreasing f , given
that drop-outs have wages set to the lowest level it follows that
E
T

f(W
1
)


W
0
= w; d
0

 E
T
[f(W
1
) jW
0
= w; d ]
As before, the inequality extends to all t  1 by induction. Again, f increasing and d
0
> d imply a
strict inequality. Combining these observations, we nd that for large enough T when w
0
 w and
d
0
 d
E
T

f(W
t
)


W
0
= w
0
; d
0

 E
T
[f(W
t
) jW
0
= w; d ] (9)
Consider the maximal equilibrium d

(w). By (9), for large enough T and all t
E
T

W
it


W
0
= w
0
; d

(w)

 E
T
[W
it
jW
0
= w; d

(w) ]
Thus,
X
t
Æ
t
i
E
T

W
it


W
0
= w
0
; d

(w)


X
t
Æ
t
i
E
T
[W
it
jW
0
= w; d

(w) ]
If d

(w)
i
= 1, then
X
t
Æ
t
i
E
T

W
it


W
0
= w
0
; d

(w)


X
t
Æ
t
i
E
T
[W
it
jW
0
= w; d

(w) ]  c
i
and so also for all d
0
 d

(w), if i is such that d

(w)
i
= 1, then
X
t
Æ
t
i
E
T

W
it


W
0
= w
0
; d
0

 c
i
: (10)
Set d
0
i
= d

(w)
i
for any i such that d

(w)
i
= 1. Fixing d
0
for such i's, nd a maximal equilibrium at
w
0
for the remaining i's, and set d
0
accordingly. By (10), it follows that d
0
is an equilibrium when
considering all agents. It follows that d
0
 d

(w). Given the denition of maximal equilibrium, it
then follows that d

(w
0
)  d
0
 d

(w).
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